Abstract
The question of why some regions reject energy cooperation initiatives that aim to improve their overall security of supply puzzles scholars and policymakers advocating for deeper regional integration through energy trade. This was the case in Northeast Asia, where efforts to create a joint oil import mechanism to improve China, South Korea and Japan’s collective bargaining power against Middle East suppliers repeatedly failed and turned instead into competing bilateral contracts at higher prices for all three countries. This article offers two explanations for this puzzle. First, the unique technical challenges and costly logistics of establishing reliable oil and gas supply routes make bilateral agreements more credible than multilateral guarantees in regions characterised by geographical remoteness and high differential vulnerability to disruptions among its members. Second, the tendency of policymakers to securitise their country’s energy supply pushes them to overemphasise their relative vulnerabilities and fear any loss of autonomy over their supplies.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 637-664 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Cambridge Review of International Affairs |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2024 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Political Science and International Relations