When Fodor Met Frege

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)467-476
Number of pages10
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.


  • Belief
  • Fodor
  • Frege
  • Kripke
  • Language of thought
  • Paderewski
  • Pragmatics
  • Propositional attitudes
  • Substitution failure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic


Dive into the research topics of 'When Fodor Met Frege'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this