When Fodor Met Frege

Jonathan Berg

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9650-9

When Fodor Met Frege

Jonathan Berg

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	467-476
Number of pages	10
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	80
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9650-9
State	Published - 1 Apr 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Keywords

Belief
Fodor
Frege
Kripke
Language of thought
Paderewski
Pragmatics
Propositional attitudes
Substitution failure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
Logic

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10.1007/s10670-014-9650-9

Cite this

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KW - Language of thought

KW - Paderewski

KW - Pragmatics

KW - Propositional attitudes

KW - Substitution failure

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When Fodor Met Frege

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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