Abstract
I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownership. The paper also extends May's theorem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 101-128 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Theoretical Economics |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2021 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © 2021 The Author.
Keywords
- D71
- G34
- K22
- Shareholder voting
- axioms
- difference rules
- merger consistency
- one share–one vote
- ratio rules
- reallocation invariance
- share majority rule
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance