Voting in corporations

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownership. The paper also extends May's theorem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)101-128
Number of pages28
JournalTheoretical Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2021
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2021 The Author.


  • D71
  • G34
  • K22
  • Shareholder voting
  • axioms
  • difference rules
  • merger consistency
  • one share–one vote
  • ratio rules
  • reallocation invariance
  • share majority rule

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)


Dive into the research topics of 'Voting in corporations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this