Very weakly dominant strategies

Benjamin Bachi; Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005

Very weakly dominant strategies

Benjamin Bachi, Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	75-78
Number of pages	4
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	132
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005
State	Published - Dec 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024

Keywords

Dominant strategies
Solution concepts

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005

Cite this

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title = "Very weakly dominant strategies",

abstract = "We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005",

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AU - Rachmilevitch, Shiran

PY - 2024/12

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N2 - We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.

AB - We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.

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KW - Solution concepts

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U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85206530460

SN - 0165-4896

VL - 132

SP - 75

EP - 78

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

ER -

Very weakly dominant strategies

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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