Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information

Ezra Einy; Ori Haimanko; Diego Moreno; Benyamin Shitovitz

doi:10.1287/moor.1080.0314

Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan pseudometric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change (even with the weak, topology on players' strategy sets), and is approximately lower semicontinuous.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	552-560
Number of pages	9
Journal	Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume	33
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0314
State	Published - Aug 2008

Keywords

Differential information
Optimal strategies
Uniform continuity
Value
Zero-sum games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Mathematics
Computer Science Applications
Management Science and Operations Research

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10.1287/moor.1080.0314

Cite this

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Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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