Abstract
This paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents, who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime, share death-related risks. When annuity markets operate, a non-discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources. In the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities, such a program will lead to a non-optimal intragenerational allocation of resources. However, the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a Pareto improving role for a mandatory non-discriminatory social security program.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 303-326 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 26 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 1985 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:*We appreciate helpful conversations and suggestions from our colleagues Jon Eaton, Lars Hansen, Robert Kaplan, Larry Kotlikoff, Chester Spatt, Robert Townsend and Allen Zelentiz. Financial support by NSF grant no. SES-8308575 is gratefully acknowledged.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics