Tullock contests reward information advantages

Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Aner Sela, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j, regardless of the information of the other players.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)34-36
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
StatePublished - Nov 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.


  • Common value
  • Information advantage
  • Tullock contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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