Tort liability, combatant activities, and the question of over-deterrence

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Immunity from tort liability for losses that are inflicted during warfare is often justified by a supposedly intuitive concern: without immunity, states and combatants will be over-deterred from engaging in combat. In this article, I test this common perception using three frameworks. First, I theoretically analyze the impact of tort liability on relevant state actors' incentives to engage in warfare. This analysis suggests that tort law is likely to under-deter state actors in relation to their decisions on whether and how to conduct hostilities. Second, I test this conclusion through an original mixed-methods exploratory research, using Israel as a test case. My findings reveal that while tort liability under-deters state actors from engaging in warfare, it can prompt them to implement regulatory measures to minimize the state's liability. Third, I offer a legal history analysis, exploring why Israel established an immunity from tort liability for losses it inflicts during combat in 1951, and why and how this immunity has expanded since. I show that as the Israel-Palestine conflict prolonged and intensified, state actors began viewing Palestinians' tort claims as a civilian means of warfare and immunity from liability as the weapon needed for defending Israel's interests.

Original languageEnglish
JournalLaw and Social Inquiry
StateAccepted/In press - 2021
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Bar Foundation.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (all)
  • Law


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