Abstract
We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 272-285 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2003 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We thank Ori Haimanko for helpful discussions. The research of Einy and Shitovitz was supported by The Israel Science Foundation, grant 871/01-31. Moreno acknowledges the support of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, grant BEC2000-0173.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics