The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly

Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)272-285
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Aug 2003

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We thank Ori Haimanko for helpful discussions. The research of Einy and Shitovitz was supported by The Israel Science Foundation, grant 871/01-31. Moreno acknowledges the support of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, grant BEC2000-0173.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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