The tradeoff of the commons

R. Preston McAfee; Alan D. Miller

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.12.003

The tradeoff of the commons

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We develop a model of scarce, renewable resources to study the commons problem. We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, property rights can often be less efficient than a commons. In particular, we study two effects: (1) waste which arises when individuals expend resources to use a resource unavailable due to congestion and (2) the risk of underutilization of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for each effect to dominate the other when the cost of determining the availability of a resource is low.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	349-353
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	96
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.12.003
State	Published - Apr 2012

Keywords

Appointments
Office hours
Property rights
Reservations
Tragedy of the commons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.12.003

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KW - Reservations

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The tradeoff of the commons

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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