The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper we investigate the number of coalitions that block a given non-competitive allocation. In an atomless economy with a finite number of types we identify coalition with its profile. Considering profiles π that represent coalitions with the same proportions of types as in the whole society, we prove that there is a ball Bπ with π as its center so that 'almost half' of the profiles in Bπ are blocking. This result is an analogous result to that of Mas-Colell (1978) who dealt with large finite markets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-255
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 1983

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of 'The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this