The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies

Benyamin Shitovitz

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(83)90042-3

The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies

Benyamin Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the number of coalitions that block a given non-competitive allocation. In an atomless economy with a finite number of types we identify coalition with its profile. Considering profiles π that represent coalitions with the same proportions of types as in the whole society, we prove that there is a ball B_π with π as its center so that 'almost half' of the profiles in B_π are blocking. This result is an analogous result to that of Mas-Colell (1978) who dealt with large finite markets.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	247-255
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	12
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90042-3
State	Published - Dec 1983

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/0304-4068(83)90042-3

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AB - In this paper we investigate the number of coalitions that block a given non-competitive allocation. In an atomless economy with a finite number of types we identify coalition with its profile. Considering profiles π that represent coalitions with the same proportions of types as in the whole society, we prove that there is a ball Bπ with π as its center so that 'almost half' of the profiles in Bπ are blocking. This result is an analogous result to that of Mas-Colell (1978) who dealt with large finite markets.

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The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies

Abstract

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