The Problem of Immediate Evidence According to Kant and Hegel

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Abstract

Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel, mutatis mutandis, reject the possibility of a self-, immediate evidence. Hence, they also reject foundationalism as a model for the desired philosophical system. Self or immediate evidence is incompatible with Kant’s idea of the human reason as a systematic whole, all of whose parts are interconnected. In a similar vein, Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel, each in his own way, reject the idea of the Given, insofar as the forms of perceptions can be isolated from the rest of human reason. Thus, their approaches oppose, in fact, those of Descartes, Hume, logical positivists, and sense data adherents, all of which, each in his own way and for his own reasons, endorse the idea of the Given or that of self, immediate evidence.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophical Studies Series
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages77-85
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022

Publication series

NamePhilosophical Studies Series
Volume147
ISSN (Print)0921-8599
ISSN (Electronic)2542-8349

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

  • Foundationalism
  • Hegel
  • Immediate evidence
  • Philosophical system
  • Spinoza
  • Systematic whole
  • The Given, insofar as the forms of perceptions, can be isolated from the rest of human reason

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Philosophy

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