The paradox of moral complaint: A reply to shaham

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In 'The Paradox of Moral Complaint' I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both Yes and No here, and therefore that our considered moral views seem to be paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the No part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical arguments, and concludes that there is no 'Paradox of Moral Complaint', seeking in particular to defend the unconditional moral 'right' of wronged wrongdoers to complain, as against my claims. I attempt to defend my position against her arguments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)277-282
Number of pages6
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Sociology and Political Science


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