Abstract
We show that the core mapping of a mixed market is the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior for the core situation. That is, an allocation belongs to the core of a market if and only if there exists no allocation in the core of a submarket that blocks it.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 379-386 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 1994 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Correspondence to: Professor Joseph Greenberg, Department of Economics, McGill 555 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2T7. *Financial support from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC GP0121665) and from Quebec’s Fonds FCAR (93-ER-1507) is gratefully ledged. Benyamin Shitovitz wishes to thank McGill University for its kind hospitality visit in the Summer of 1992, a time at which this paper was written.
Keywords
- Competitive equilibrium
- Core
- Mixed markets (with atoms)
- Optimistic stability
- Social situations
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics
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