The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets

Joseph Greenberg; Benyamin Shitovitz

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(94)90020-5

The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets

Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that the core mapping of a mixed market is the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior for the core situation. That is, an allocation belongs to the core of a market if and only if there exists no allocation in the core of a submarket that blocks it.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	379-386
Number of pages	8
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	23
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90020-5
State	Published - Jul 1994

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Correspondence to: Professor Joseph Greenberg, Department of Economics, McGill 555 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2T7. *Financial support from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC GP0121665) and from Quebec’s Fonds FCAR (93-ER-1507) is gratefully ledged. Benyamin Shitovitz wishes to thank McGill University for its kind hospitality visit in the Summer of 1992, a time at which this paper was written.

Keywords

Competitive equilibrium
Core
Mixed markets (with atoms)
Optimistic stability
Social situations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/0304-4068(94)90020-5

Cite this

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author = "Joseph Greenberg and Benyamin Shitovitz",

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AB - We show that the core mapping of a mixed market is the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior for the core situation. That is, an allocation belongs to the core of a market if and only if there exists no allocation in the core of a submarket that blocks it.

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The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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