The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets

Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We show that the core mapping of a mixed market is the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior for the core situation. That is, an allocation belongs to the core of a market if and only if there exists no allocation in the core of a submarket that blocks it.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)379-386
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 1994

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Correspondence to: Professor Joseph Greenberg, Department of Economics, McGill 555 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2T7. *Financial support from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC GP0121665) and from Quebec’s Fonds FCAR (93-ER-1507) is gratefully ledged. Benyamin Shitovitz wishes to thank McGill University for its kind hospitality visit in the Summer of 1992, a time at which this paper was written.


  • Competitive equilibrium
  • Core
  • Mixed markets (with atoms)
  • Optimistic stability
  • Social situations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


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