Abstract
Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in terms of attitudes that a hoper bears towards a hoped-for prospect, such as desire and probability assignment. I argue that all of these accounts misidentify cases of despair as cases of hope, and so misconstrue the nature of hope. I show that a more satisfactory view is arrived at by noticing that in addition to the aforementioned attitudes, hope involves a characteristic attitude towards an external factor, on whose operation the hoper takes the prospect's realization to depend causally.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 216-233 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Ratio |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2009 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy