The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I state and prove formal versions of the claim that the Nash (Econometrica 18: 155–162, 1950) bargaining solution creates a compromise between egalitarianism and utilitarianism, but that this compromise is “biased”: the Nash solution puts more emphasis on utilitarianism than it puts on egalitarianism. I also extend the bargaining model by assuming that utility can be transferred between the players at some cost (the transferable and non-transferable utility models are polar cases of this more general one, corresponding to the cases where the transfer cost is zero and infinity, respectively); I use the extended model to better understand the connections between egalitarianism and utilitarianism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)463-478
Number of pages16
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.


  • Bargaining
  • Egalitarianism
  • Nash solution
  • Utilitarianism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
  • Computer Science Applications


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