The (in) effectiveness of procurement auctions in the public sector

Yizhaq Minchuk, Shlomo Mizrahi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This article studies procurement auctions in the public sector using game theoretical tools. The article shows that when participants in an auction are agents with low abilities (low type), as is common in the public sector, they place the same contract request. As a result, the auction mechanism will rarely produce real competition, thus making this mechanism, which limits bidders to those already within the system, ineffective for use in the public sector job market.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-249
Number of pages3
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Issue number4
StatePublished - 23 Feb 2017
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.


  • Public sector
  • asymmetry
  • auctions
  • procurement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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