This article analyses the implications of international aid for the failure of Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation in Jerusalem. Donors were motivated to contribute to efforts to reach a sustainable Palestinian-Israeli peace to be based on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In this article the main argument is that in practice, due to political considerations, international aid at least partially harmed the peace process and helped Israel enhance its control over East Jerusalem and harmed the efforts to reach a reconciliation in the holy city.
|Number of pages||15|
|Journal||Defence and Peace Economics|
|State||Published - Dec 2020|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Prior to the emergence of the Palestinian national movement and its conflict with Zionism, Jerusalem gained a great deal of international attention due to its religious and political status. This attention increased after the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and markedly and significantly with the beginning of the first Intifada (1987) and the emphasis on East Jerusalem and its national institutions as the future capital of a Palestinian state that was supposedly nearing formation. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the first Intifada, especially before and after the Madrid Conference in 1990, the Washington negotiations (1990–1993), the Oslo negotiations and the 1993 Declaration of Principles, were all supported by a Palestinian unified political leadership and a large team of local and international experts in different fields, all of whom were based in the Orient House in East Jerusalem. These efforts were supported by generous financial aid, provided mainly by European and Arab countries, to the Palestinians.
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
- international aid
- israel-palestine conflict
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics