The hubris of initial victory: The IDF and the second Lebanon war

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

The Second Lebanon War, as the Israeli Parliament decided in March 2007 to officially name the 12 July-14 August 2006 conflict between Hizbollah and Israel, has attracted an impressive body of academic literature. Among the aspects of the war that have been explored so far are the following: causes of the failures of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), 1 operational aspects, 2 Hizbollah’s method of making war, 3 its short-range rocket arsenal as a new type of challenge for the Israeli Air Force (IAF), 4 Israel’s intelligence during the war, 5 the war as a test of Israel’s deterrence capability, 6 and the implications of this conflict for US military strategy.7 In addition, a number of Israeli students used the war in order to shed light on the way democracies fight an asymmetric conflict, 8 the way a civil society functions during a military conflict, 9 and civil-military relations in Israel.10.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIsrael and Hizbollah
Subtitle of host publicationAn asymmetric conflict in historical and comparative perspective
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages147-162
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9781135229207
ISBN (Print)9780415449106
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2009

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2010 Selection and editorial matter, Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Arts and Humanities
  • General Social Sciences

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