The hubris of initial victory: The IDF and the second Lebanon war

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


The Second Lebanon War, as the Israeli Parliament decided in March 2007 to officially name the 12 July-14 August 2006 conflict between Hizbollah and Israel, has attracted an impressive body of academic literature. Among the aspects of the war that have been explored so far are the following: causes of the failures of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), 1 operational aspects, 2 Hizbollah’s method of making war, 3 its short-range rocket arsenal as a new type of challenge for the Israeli Air Force (IAF), 4 Israel’s intelligence during the war, 5 the war as a test of Israel’s deterrence capability, 6 and the implications of this conflict for US military strategy.7 In addition, a number of Israeli students used the war in order to shed light on the way democracies fight an asymmetric conflict, 8 the way a civil society functions during a military conflict, 9 and civil-military relations in Israel.10.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIsrael and Hizbollah
Subtitle of host publicationAn asymmetric conflict in historical and comparative perspective
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9781135229207
ISBN (Print)9780415449106
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2009

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2010 Selection and editorial matter, Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Arts and Humanities
  • General Social Sciences


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