Abstract
This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 584-608 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Journal of Strategic Studies |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 7 Jun 2014 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2014, © 2014 Taylor & Francis.
Keywords
- Decision-making
- Egypt
- Intelligence
- Israel
- October 1973 War
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations