The Fisherman's problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game

Klaus Abbink; Ron Darziv; Zohar Gilula; Harel Goren; Bernd Irlenbusch; Arnon Keren; Bettina Rockenbach; Abdolkarim Sadrieh; Reinhard Selten; Shmuel Zamir

doi:10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00014-X

The Fisherman's problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game

Klaus Abbink, Ron Darziv, Zohar Gilula, Harel Goren, Bernd Irlenbusch, Arnon Keren, Bettina Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Reinhard Selten, Shmuel Zamir

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We introduce and experiment the Fisherman's Game in which the application of economic theory leads to four different benchmarks. Non-cooperative sequential rationality predicts one extreme outcome while the core (which coincides with the competitive market equilibrium) predicts the other extreme. Intermediate, disjoint outcomes are predicted by fairness utility models and the Shapley value. None of the four benchmarks fully explains the observed behavior. However, since elements of both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory are crucial for organizing our data, we conclude that effort towards bridging the gap between the various concepts is a promising approach for future economic research.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	425-445
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Economic Psychology
Volume	24
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00014-X
State	Published - Aug 2003
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors thank the teams of the RatioLab at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung at the University of Bonn for their aid in collecting the data. Furthermore, the authors thank seminar and conference participants in Bari, Bilbao, Munich, and Tilburg, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the Sonderforschungsbereich 303, by the German–Israeli Foundation (GIF), by the European Union through the TMR program ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238), and by the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen is gratefully acknowledged.

Keywords

Backward induction
Competition
Experimental economics
Game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Applied Psychology
Sociology and Political Science
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00014-X

Cite this

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abstract = "We introduce and experiment the Fisherman's Game in which the application of economic theory leads to four different benchmarks. Non-cooperative sequential rationality predicts one extreme outcome while the core (which coincides with the competitive market equilibrium) predicts the other extreme. Intermediate, disjoint outcomes are predicted by fairness utility models and the Shapley value. None of the four benchmarks fully explains the observed behavior. However, since elements of both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory are crucial for organizing our data, we conclude that effort towards bridging the gap between the various concepts is a promising approach for future economic research.",

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note = "Funding Information: The authors thank the teams of the RatioLab at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Laboratorium f{\"u}r experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung at the University of Bonn for their aid in collecting the data. Furthermore, the authors thank seminar and conference participants in Bari, Bilbao, Munich, and Tilburg, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the Sonderforschungsbereich 303, by the German–Israeli Foundation (GIF), by the European Union through the TMR program ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238), and by the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen is gratefully acknowledged. ",

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AU - Keren, Arnon

AU - Rockenbach, Bettina

AU - Sadrieh, Abdolkarim

AU - Selten, Reinhard

AU - Zamir, Shmuel

N1 - Funding Information: The authors thank the teams of the RatioLab at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung at the University of Bonn for their aid in collecting the data. Furthermore, the authors thank seminar and conference participants in Bari, Bilbao, Munich, and Tilburg, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the Sonderforschungsbereich 303, by the German–Israeli Foundation (GIF), by the European Union through the TMR program ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238), and by the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen is gratefully acknowledged.

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The Fisherman's problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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