The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications

Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benjamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study the core of a non-atomic game υ which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension ῡ on the space B1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension v is concave then the core of the game υ is non-empty iff ῡ is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of B1. We use this result to obtain representation theorems for the core of a non-atomic game of the form υ = f o μ where μ is a finite dimensional vector of measures and f is a concave function. We also apply our results to some non-atomic games which occur in economic applications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-14
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 1999


  • Coalitional game
  • Core
  • Non-atomic games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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