The Contrariety of Combatibilist Positions

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The compatibilist position on the free will problem tends to be perceived as clear, rather unitary and consistent even by those who oppose it. This notion is mistaken, and is harmful to the recognition of the weaknesses and strengths of compatibilism. By examining the three main compatibilist positions and their interrelationships, I attempt to see whether compatibilists can continue to hold together the different positions; and if they cannot, which position they should remain with. The conclusions reached are that compatibilists ought to opt for one (‘control’) type of compatibilism, but that compatibilism is only partially convincing.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-308
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Philosophical Research
StatePublished - 1991


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