Abstract
We show that for a large class of both finite and mixed market games, the Bargaining Set coincides with the core, and is strictly larger than the set of all Walrasian allocations. This is to be constrasted with the recently established equivalence between the three sets in atomless markets.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 377-383 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1989 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics
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