The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector

Benyamin Shitovitz

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(89)90013-X

The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector

Benyamin Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that for a large class of both finite and mixed market games, the Bargaining Set coincides with the core, and is strictly larger than the set of all Walrasian allocations. This is to be constrasted with the recently established equivalence between the three sets in atomless markets.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	377-383
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	18
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(89)90013-X
State	Published - 1989

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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abstract = "We show that for a large class of both finite and mixed market games, the Bargaining Set coincides with the core, and is strictly larger than the set of all Walrasian allocations. This is to be constrasted with the recently established equivalence between the three sets in atomless markets.",

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The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector

Abstract

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