We study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the core in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff. Thus, the nucleolus discriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndicated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors, the syndicate is treated more favorably under the asymptotic nucleolus than under the Shapley value associated with the pure monopolistic market. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D40.
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1We thank a referee for helpful comments. Part of this work was done while Einy and Shitovitz visited the Department of Economics of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Einy acknowledges the financial support of the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Shitovitz acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Education, Grant SAB98-0059. Moreno acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Education (DGICYT), Grant PB96-0118.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics