Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players

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I study games with countably many players, each of whom has finitely many pure strategies. The following are constructed: (i) a game that has a strong ϵ equilibrium for all ϵ> 0 but does not have a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) a symmetric game in which Nash equilibria exist, but all of them are asymmetric. Some additional results about infinite symmetric games are also derived.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)709-717
Number of pages9
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.


  • Approximate equilibrium
  • Infinite games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Symmetric games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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