Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1007/s00182-015-0479-5

Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I study games with countably many players, each of whom has finitely many pure strategies. The following are constructed: (i) a game that has a strong ϵ equilibrium for all ϵ> 0 but does not have a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) a symmetric game in which Nash equilibria exist, but all of them are asymmetric. Some additional results about infinite symmetric games are also derived.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	709-717
Number of pages	9
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	45
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0479-5
State	Published - 1 Aug 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Keywords

Approximate equilibrium
Infinite games
Nash equilibrium
Symmetric games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/s00182-015-0479-5

Cite this

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Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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