I study games with countably many players, each of whom has finitely many pure strategies. The following are constructed: (i) a game that has a strong ϵ equilibrium for all ϵ> 0 but does not have a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) a symmetric game in which Nash equilibria exist, but all of them are asymmetric. Some additional results about infinite symmetric games are also derived.
|Number of pages||9|
|Journal||International Journal of Game Theory|
|State||Published - 1 Aug 2016|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
- Approximate equilibrium
- Infinite games
- Nash equilibrium
- Symmetric games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty