Abstract
I construct examples of symmetric 2-person games that have Nash equilibria, but no symmetric Nash equilibria (not even in mixed strategies). Such an example was first constructed by Fey (Games Econ Behav 75: 424-427, 2012). In his example, the actions set is compact and the payoff function is discontinuous. Here, by contrast, payoff functions are continuous, but the actions sets are not compact.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 65-68 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Economic Theory Bulletin |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Times Cited in Web of Science Core Collection: 0 Total Times Cited: 0 Cited Reference Count: 8Keywords
- Symmetry
- Symmetric equilibrium
- EXISTENCE