Strategic surprise or fundamental flaws? The sources of Israel's military defeat at the beginning of the 1973 war

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

During the decade after the 1973 War of Yom Kippur, the consensus was that Israel's military defeat in the war's first stage was caused by the failure of intelligence to provide a warning prior to the Arab attack, but many experts maintained later that it reflected improper preparations for war. Using recently released evidence, this article analyzes Israel's inadequate war deployment when firing commenced and its impact on the failure to repel the attack. It concludes that since this deficient deployment resulted from the absence of a sufficient intelligence warning, the intelligence failure was at the root of the Israeli failure at the war's start.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWarfare in the Middle East since 1945
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages151-172
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781315234304
ISBN (Print)9780754624790
StatePublished - 15 May 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Ahron Bregman 2008. All rights reserved.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities (all)

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