Strategic interactions and atoms' power in public goods economies

Hovav Perets, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the non-cooperative provision of public goods by voluntary contributions in an economy with a mixed measure space of consumers and a finite number of private goods and public goods. In a pure public goods economy, each consumer is allocating her endowment between consumption of the private goods and her contribution to the public goods. For a finite number of consumers see Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Bernheim (1986), and for a mixed measure space of consumers see Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)33-44
Number of pages12
JournalRecherches Economiques de Louvain
Volume79
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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