Strategic bidding in an accumulating priority queue: equilibrium analysis

Moshe Haviv, Liron Ravner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/1 queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in exchange. The priority of each customer in the queue is a linear function of the individual waiting time, with the purchased coefficient being the slope. The unique pure Nash equilibrium is solved explicitly for the case with homogeneous customers. A general characterisation of the Nash equilibrium is provided for the heterogeneous case. It is shown that both avoid the crowd and follow the crowd behaviors are prevalent, within class types and between them. We further present a pricing mechanism that ensures the order of the accumulating priority rates in equilibrium follows a Cμ type rule and improves overall efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)505-523
Number of pages19
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2016
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.


  • Dynamic priority
  • Queue priority pricing
  • Queueing games
  • Strategic priority purchasing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Management Science and Operations Research


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