Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I characterize the individually-rational utilitarian bargaining solution by combining several classical axioms with a novel axiom, monotone step-by-step negotiations (monotone SSN). One of the axioms involved in the characterization is conflict freeness, which imposes Pareto optimality on problems that include their ideal point; when conflict freeness is replaced by weak Pareto optimality, only one additional solution becomes admissible—the egalitarian solution. I also show that in Kalai’s (Econometrica 45:1623–1630, 1977) SSN-based characterization of the proportional solutions, SSN can be weakened to monotone SSN if feasible set continuity is assumed.

Original languageEnglish
Article number2
Pages (from-to)433-445
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE part of Springer Nature.


  • Bargaining
  • C71
  • C78
  • Step-by-step negotiations
  • Utilitarianism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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