Abstract
I characterize the individually-rational utilitarian bargaining solution by combining several classical axioms with a novel axiom, monotone step-by-step negotiations (monotone SSN). One of the axioms involved in the characterization is conflict freeness, which imposes Pareto optimality on problems that include their ideal point; when conflict freeness is replaced by weak Pareto optimality, only one additional solution becomes admissible—the egalitarian solution. I also show that in Kalai’s (Econometrica 45:1623–1630, 1977) SSN-based characterization of the proportional solutions, SSN can be weakened to monotone SSN if feasible set continuity is assumed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 433-445 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE part of Springer Nature.
Keywords
- Bargaining
- C71
- C78
- Step-by-step negotiations
- Utilitarianism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty