Stable provision vs. Cournot-nash equilibria in pure public good economies

Benyamin Shitovitz, Menahem Spiegel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83, pp. 1-18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utilitywise) to their Cournot-Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot-Nash consumption bundles.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-224
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics


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