(Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies

Joseph Greenberg, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Within the framework of (pure) exchange economics, we demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in the allocation space may differ from that in the corresponding utility space. Following Harsanyi (1974, Management Sci. 20, 1472-1495), we then define the notion of the sophisticated stable set and establish an equivalence theorem: like the core, the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space coincides with that in the utility space. We also show that the sophisticated stable set has the desirable property of individual rationality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, C70, C71.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)54-70
Number of pages17
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2002

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
1We thank Prof. Kalai, the editor in charge, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) is gratefully acknowledged.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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