Abstract
We consider a class of resource dilemmas of the following form: members of groups of size n are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j (j = 1,...,n) requests rj from the resource pool. Requests are made either simultaneously or sequentially. If (r1+r2+...+rn)≤ x all members are granted their requests; otherwise, group members get nothing. For each protocol of play we present two alternative models - a game theoretical equilibrium solution and a psychological model incorporating the notion of focal points. We then report the results of two experiments designed to compare the two models under the two protocols of play.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 297-310 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Acta Psychologica |
Volume | 80 |
Issue number | 1-3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1992 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:* The research reported in this paper was supported in part by a Fund for Basic Research Grant from the Israeli National Academy of Science and Humanities, and in part by Grant No. SE%9107439 from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Correspondence ro: D.V. Budescu, Dept. of Psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel. E-mail: rsps308@haifauvm
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)