We consider a class of resource dilemmas of the following form: members of groups of size n are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j (j = 1,...,n) requests rj from the resource pool. Requests are made either simultaneously or sequentially. If (r1+r2+...+rn)≤ x all members are granted their requests; otherwise, group members get nothing. For each protocol of play we present two alternative models - a game theoretical equilibrium solution and a psychological model incorporating the notion of focal points. We then report the results of two experiments designed to compare the two models under the two protocols of play.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
* The research reported in this paper was supported in part by a Fund for Basic Research Grant from the Israeli National Academy of Science and Humanities, and in part by Grant No. SE%9107439 from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Correspondence ro: D.V. Budescu, Dept. of Psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel. E-mail: rsps308@haifauvm
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)