Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems

Roberto Avanzi; Simon Hoerder; Dan Page; Michael Tunstall

doi:10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9

Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems

Roberto Avanzi, Simon Hoerder, Dan Page, Michael Tunstall

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Research within "post-quantum" cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216-229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	271-281
Number of pages	11
Journal	Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Volume	1
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9
State	Published - Dec 2011
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The research described in this paper was conducted while the first author was a member of the Faculty of Mathematics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. This work has been supported in part by EPSRC grants EP/H001689/1 and EP/F039638/1.

Keywords

Embedded systems
McEliece
Niederreiter
Public-key cryptography
Side-channel attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9

Cite this

@article{1a254dfc18f04589b5b3d57c17bd7802,

title = "Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems",

abstract = "Research within {"}post-quantum{"} cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216-229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.",

keywords = "Embedded systems, McEliece, Niederreiter, Public-key cryptography, Side-channel attack",

author = "Roberto Avanzi and Simon Hoerder and Dan Page and Michael Tunstall",

note = "Funding Information: The research described in this paper was conducted while the first author was a member of the Faculty of Mathematics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. This work has been supported in part by EPSRC grants EP/H001689/1 and EP/F039638/1. ",

year = "2011",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9",

language = "English",

volume = "1",

pages = "271--281",

journal = "Journal of Cryptographic Engineering",

issn = "2190-8508",

publisher = "Springer Science + Business Media",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems

AU - Avanzi, Roberto

AU - Hoerder, Simon

AU - Page, Dan

AU - Tunstall, Michael

N1 - Funding Information: The research described in this paper was conducted while the first author was a member of the Faculty of Mathematics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. This work has been supported in part by EPSRC grants EP/H001689/1 and EP/F039638/1.

PY - 2011/12

Y1 - 2011/12

N2 - Research within "post-quantum" cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216-229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.

AB - Research within "post-quantum" cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216-229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.

KW - Embedded systems

KW - McEliece

KW - Niederreiter

KW - Public-key cryptography

KW - Side-channel attack

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84884485543&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9

DO - 10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84884485543

SN - 2190-8508

VL - 1

SP - 271

EP - 281

JO - Journal of Cryptographic Engineering

JF - Journal of Cryptographic Engineering

IS - 4

ER -

Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this