Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems

Roberto Avanzi, Simon Hoerder, Dan Page, Michael Tunstall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Research within "post-quantum" cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216-229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)271-281
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Cryptographic Engineering
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 2011
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The research described in this paper was conducted while the first author was a member of the Faculty of Mathematics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. This work has been supported in part by EPSRC grants EP/H001689/1 and EP/F039638/1.


  • Embedded systems
  • McEliece
  • Niederreiter
  • Public-key cryptography
  • Side-channel attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications


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