## Abstract

We consider a class of social dilemmas in which groups of size n are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member requests a share of the common pool; requests are made sequentially with complete information about the preceding requests. Individual requests are granted if and only if the total group request is equal to or smaller than x. Experimental data show significant and consistent effects due to the player's position in the sequence and the amount of uncertainty about x. The results are used to test competitively two models-a subgame perfect equilibrium solution grounded in the logic of game theory and a modified equal share model based on the notion of focal points. On the average, the modified equal share model outperforms the equilibrium model in predicting the players' requests. Additional tests of the two models are proposed.

Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 241-265 |

Number of pages | 25 |

Journal | Journal of Mathematical Psychology |

Volume | 37 |

Issue number | 2 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jun 1993 |

Externally published | Yes |

## ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Psychology (all)
- Applied Mathematics