Self-referentiality and two arguments refuting physicalism

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I suggest two valid and sound arguments refuting physicalism, whether it is reductive or supervenience physicalism. The first argument is a self-referential one that is not involved with any self-referential inconsistency. The second argument demonstrates that physicalism is inescapably involved with self-referential inconsistency. Both arguments show that arguments and propositions (to be distinguished from sentences) are not physical existents. They are rather mental existents that are not reducible to any physical existent and do not supervene on anything physical. From these two arguments it clearly follows that any physicalist argument or proposition, as a mental existent, is self-refuting.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)471-477
Number of pages7
JournalInternational Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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