Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring: The need for nonstationary strategies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The minmax in repeated games with imperfect monitoring can differ from the minmax of those games with perfect monitoring when two or more players are able to gain common information known only to themselves, and utilize this information at a later stage. Gossner and Tomala showed that in a class of such games, the minmax is given by a weighted average of the payoffs of two main strategies: one in which the information is gained, and the other in which the information is utilized. However, all examples analyzed to date require only one main strategy in which information is created and utilized simultaneously. We show that two strategies are indeed needed by providing and solving a concrete example of a three-player game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)425-435
Number of pages11
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2007
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Correlation system
  • Entropy
  • Imperfect monitoring
  • Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Mathematics
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

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