Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs

Todd Kaplan; Aner Sela

doi:10.3390/g13050062

Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs

Todd Kaplan, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.

Original language	English
Article number	62
Journal	Games
Volume	13
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g13050062
State	Published - Oct 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 by the authors.

Keywords

asymmetric auctions
entry costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Applied Mathematics

Access to Document

10.3390/g13050062

Cite this

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abstract = "We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.",

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AB - We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.

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Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this