Scheduling selfish jobs on multidimensional parallel machines

Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study the multidimensional vector scheduling problem with selfish jobs, both in non-cooperative and in cooperative versions. We show existence of assignments that are Nash, strong Nash, weakly and strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria in these settings. We improve upon the previous bounds on the price of anarchy for the non-cooperative case, and find tight bounds for every number of machines and dimension. For the cooperative case we provide tight bounds on the strong prices of anarchy and stability, as well as tight bounds on weakly and strictly Pareto optimal prices of anarchy and stability, for every number of machines and dimension.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSPAA 2014 - Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages108-117
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9781450328210
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA 2014 - Prague, Czech Republic
Duration: 23 Jun 201425 Jun 2014

Publication series

NameAnnual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures

Conference

Conference26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA 2014
Country/TerritoryCzech Republic
CityPrague
Period23/06/1425/06/14

Keywords

  • Multidimensional scheduling
  • Parallel machines
  • Price of anarchy
  • Scheduling games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Hardware and Architecture

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