Rules for aggregating information

Christopher P. Chambers; Alan D. Miller

doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5

Rules for aggregating information

Christopher P. Chambers
, Alan D. Miller

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We present a model of information aggregation in which agents' information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	75-82
Number of pages	8
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	36
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5
State	Published - Jan 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5

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AB - We present a model of information aggregation in which agents' information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.

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Rules for aggregating information

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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