Rules for aggregating information

Christopher P. Chambers, Alan D. Miller

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We present a model of information aggregation in which agents' information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)75-82
Number of pages8
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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