Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We consider mechanisms for markets that are two-sided and have agents with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The agents of the market are strategic and act to optimize their own utilities, while the mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting motivated by a foreseeable privacy-aware future form of online advertising. Recently, it has been suggested that markets of user information built around information brokers could be introduced to the online advertising ecosystem to overcome online privacy concerns. Such markets give users control over which data gets shared in online advertising exchanges. We describe a model for the above form of online advertising and design two mechanisms for this model. The first is a deterministic mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction and allows agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The second is a randomized mechanism that can handle a more general version of the model. We provide theoretical analyses of our mechanisms and study their performance using simulations based on real-world data.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings
EditorsXiaotie Deng
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages163-175
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783319996592
DOIs
StatePublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes
Event11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018 - Beijing, China
Duration: 11 Sep 201813 Sep 2018

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11059 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018
Country/TerritoryChina
CityBeijing
Period11/09/1813/09/18

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Horizon 2020 funded project TYPES (Project number: 653449. Call Identifier H2020-DS-2014-1).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

  • Double-sided market
  • Mechanism design
  • Multi-dimensional players
  • Online advertising market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science (all)

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