Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

Moran Feldman; Rica Gonen

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We consider mechanisms for markets that are two-sided and have agents with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The agents of the market are strategic and act to optimize their own utilities, while the mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting motivated by a foreseeable privacy-aware future form of online advertising. Recently, it has been suggested that markets of user information built around information brokers could be introduced to the online advertising ecosystem to overcome online privacy concerns. Such markets give users control over which data gets shared in online advertising exchanges. We describe a model for the above form of online advertising and design two mechanisms for this model. The first is a deterministic mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction and allows agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The second is a randomized mechanism that can handle a more general version of the model. We provide theoretical analyses of our mechanisms and study their performance using simulations based on real-world data.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings
Editors	Xiaotie Deng
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	163-175
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Print)	9783319996592
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15
State	Published - 2018
Externally published	Yes
Event	11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018 - Beijing, China Duration: 11 Sep 2018 → 13 Sep 2018

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11059 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018
Country/Territory	China
City	Beijing
Period	11/09/18 → 13/09/18

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

Double-sided market
Mechanism design
Multi-dimensional players
Online advertising market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

Cite this

Feldman, M., & Gonen, R. (2018). Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants. In X. Deng (Ed.), Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings (pp. 163-175). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11059 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

Feldman, Moran ; Gonen, Rica. / Removal and threshold pricing : Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants. Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings. editor / Xiaotie Deng. Springer Verlag, 2018. pp. 163-175 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants",

abstract = "We consider mechanisms for markets that are two-sided and have agents with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The agents of the market are strategic and act to optimize their own utilities, while the mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting motivated by a foreseeable privacy-aware future form of online advertising. Recently, it has been suggested that markets of user information built around information brokers could be introduced to the online advertising ecosystem to overcome online privacy concerns. Such markets give users control over which data gets shared in online advertising exchanges. We describe a model for the above form of online advertising and design two mechanisms for this model. The first is a deterministic mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction and allows agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The second is a randomized mechanism that can handle a more general version of the model. We provide theoretical analyses of our mechanisms and study their performance using simulations based on real-world data.",

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author = "Moran Feldman and Rica Gonen",

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year = "2018",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15",

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Feldman, M & Gonen, R 2018, Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants. in X Deng (ed.), Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11059 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 163-175, 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018, Beijing, China, 11/09/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants. / Feldman, Moran; Gonen, Rica.
Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Xiaotie Deng. Springer Verlag, 2018. p. 163-175 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11059 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Feldman M, Gonen R. Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants. In Deng X, editor, Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2018. p. 163-175. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this