Abstract
This essay argues that regional competition law agreements on joint enforcement and advocacy (<span style="font-variant: small-caps">rjca</span>s) hold an important potential to solve many of the enforcement problems that small and developing jurisdictions face and can provide additional benefits that go beyond such solutions. It also argues that the costs involved in such agreements are not prohibitive and that many of these costs can be overcome by structuring appropriate solutions. Accordingly, <span style="font-variant: small-caps">rjca</ span>s have the potential to create Pareto superior solutions to enforcement problems relative to unilateral enforcement. The essay then broadens the analysis to the potential effects of <span style="font-variant: small-caps">rjca</span>s on non-member states. It is argued that such agreements create much lower negative externalities for non-member states and for international coordination efforts than regional trade agreements. On the contrary, they often create positive externalities for non-member jurisdictions. Accordingly, they offer important potential for strengthening competition law enforcement and should generally be encouraged. In addition, as the article shows, <span style="font-variant: small- caps">rjca</span>s can further international efforts for coordination and cooperation in competition law.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 239-261 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | University of Toronto Law Journal |
Volume | 60 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2010 |
Keywords
- antitrust
- competition law
- developing jurisdictions
- regional agreements
- small economies
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Law