Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing

György Dósa, Leah Epstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The bin packing problem deals with packing items of sizes no larger than 1 into unit capacity bins. Here, we analyze a class of bin packing games where the cost of an item is 1 over the total number of items packed into its bin, which is a bin packing congestion game. We study strong equilibria and find the tight values of the SPoA and SPoS, that is, asymptotic approximation ratios of the worst and best strong equilibria. We show that these values are approximately 1.69103 and 1.611824, respectively. In particular, we observe that the two values are not equal, showing a difference from other known kinds of cost sharing approaches.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)473-485
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Scheduling
Issue number4
StatePublished - 15 Aug 2019

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Supported by VKSZ_12-1-2013-0088 “Development of cloud based smart IT solutions by IBM Hungary in cooperation with the University of Pannonia” and by National Research, Development and Innovation Office—NKFIH under the Grant SNN 116095. Dosa acknowledges the financial support of Széchenyi 2020 under the EFOP-3.6.1-16-2016-00015.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.


  • Bin packing
  • Price of anarchy
  • Strong equilibria

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Engineering (all)
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Artificial Intelligence


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