Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution

Ramzi Suleiman, Amnon Rapoport

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show that the level of contribution depends on the provision threshold, and that it increases when contributions are not restricted to be all‐or‐none. We present, discuss, and competitively test two models for this class of social dilemmas, one postulating maximization of expected utility and the other yielding an equitable solution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-153
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Behavioral Decision Making
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1992
Externally publishedYes


  • Equity model
  • Expected utility model
  • Nonco‐operative game
  • Social dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Strategy and Management


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