Abstract
We analyze repeated games in which players have private information about their levels of patience and in which they would like to maintain the privacy of this information vis-à-vis third parties. We show that privacy protection in the form of shielding players’ actions from outside observers is harmful, as it limits and sometimes eliminates the possibility of attaining Pareto-optimal payoffs.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 759-784 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Dynamic Games and Applications |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
Keywords
- Perception games
- Privacy
- Privacy protection
- Signaling games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Economics and Econometrics
- Computer Science Applications
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Computational Mathematics
- Applied Mathematics