Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions

Shunit Agmon; Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda; Assaf Schuster

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3

Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions

Shunit Agmon, Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster

Caesarea Rothschild Institute for Interdisciplinary Applications of Computer Science (C.R.I.)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Cloud providers are moving towards auctioning cloud resources rather than renting them using fixed prices. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions are likely to be used for that purpose, since they maximize social welfare—the participants’ aggregate valuation of the resources. However, VCG auctions are prone to collusion, where users try to increase their profits at the expense of auction efficiency. We propose a coalition formation mechanism for cloud users that helps both users and providers. Our mechanism allows the auction participants to collaborate profitably while also maintaining the auction’s resource allocation efficiency. Our experiments show that when using our mechanism, participants’ mean profit increases by up to 1.67x, without harming the provider’s allocation efficiency.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 15th International Conference, GECON 2018, Proceedings
Editors	Massimo Coppola, Emanuele Carlini, José Ángel Bañares, Daniele D’Agostino, Jörn Altmann
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	24-38
Number of pages	15
ISBN (Print)	9783030133412
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3
State	Published - 2019
Event	15th International Conference on the Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, GECON 2018 - Pisa, Italy Duration: 18 Sep 2018 → 20 Sep 2018

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11113 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	15th International Conference on the Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, GECON 2018
Country/Territory	Italy
City	Pisa
Period	18/09/18 → 20/09/18

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

Auctions
Cloud
Collusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3

Cite this

Agmon, S., Agmon Ben-Yehuda, O., & Schuster, A. (2019). Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions. In M. Coppola, E. Carlini, J. Á. Bañares, D. D’Agostino, & J. Altmann (Eds.), Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 15th International Conference, GECON 2018, Proceedings (pp. 24-38). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11113 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3

Agmon, Shunit ; Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Orna ; Schuster, Assaf. / Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions. Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 15th International Conference, GECON 2018, Proceedings. editor / Massimo Coppola ; Emanuele Carlini ; José Ángel Bañares ; Daniele D’Agostino ; Jörn Altmann. Springer Verlag, 2019. pp. 24-38 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Agmon, S, Agmon Ben-Yehuda, O & Schuster, A 2019, Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions. in M Coppola, E Carlini, JÁ Bañares, D D’Agostino & J Altmann (eds), Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 15th International Conference, GECON 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11113 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 24-38, 15th International Conference on the Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, GECON 2018, Pisa, Italy, 18/09/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3

Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions. / Agmon, Shunit; Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Orna; Schuster, Assaf.
Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 15th International Conference, GECON 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Massimo Coppola; Emanuele Carlini; José Ángel Bañares; Daniele D’Agostino; Jörn Altmann. Springer Verlag, 2019. p. 24-38 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11113 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AU - Schuster, Assaf

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AB - Cloud providers are moving towards auctioning cloud resources rather than renting them using fixed prices. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions are likely to be used for that purpose, since they maximize social welfare—the participants’ aggregate valuation of the resources. However, VCG auctions are prone to collusion, where users try to increase their profits at the expense of auction efficiency. We propose a coalition formation mechanism for cloud users that helps both users and providers. Our mechanism allows the auction participants to collaborate profitably while also maintaining the auction’s resource allocation efficiency. Our experiments show that when using our mechanism, participants’ mean profit increases by up to 1.67x, without harming the provider’s allocation efficiency.

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Agmon S, Agmon Ben-Yehuda O, Schuster A. Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions. In Coppola M, Carlini E, Bañares JÁ, D’Agostino D, Altmann J, editors, Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services - 15th International Conference, GECON 2018, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2019. p. 24-38. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_3

Preventing collusion in cloud computing auctions

Abstract

Publication series

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Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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